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NOTE
GAMESTOPPED: VERNOR V. AUTODESK AND
THE FUTURE OF RESALE
Charles Lopresto*
In 1908, the United States Supreme Court established the first-sale
doctrine, which entitles the legitimate purchaser of a copyrighted work
to sell the copyrighted work without the permission of the copyright
holder. Applying the doctrine in the context of books; Congress subse-
quently codified the first-sale doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1976.
Since then, courts have extended first-sale protection beyond the written
word-applying it to videotapes, and later DVDs. However, courts have
struggled to apply the first-sale doctrine in the context of the increas-
ingly digital, and thus less tangible media through which information is
transmitted in the twenty-first century. The jurisprudence surrounding
the application of copyright protection to computer software is muddled,
in particular regarding how courts determine whether a consumer is an
owner (and thus able to receive first-sale protection for reselling a copy-
righted work) or merely a licensee. Recently, in Vernor v. Autodesk, a
panel of judges on the Ninth Circuit attempted to reconcile its competing
precedents in the application of first-sale copyright protection to com-
puter software. The Ninth Circuit had previously taken two differing ap-
proaches: the "Wise" approach, in which the circumstances of the
transaction determine the question of ownership (an approach favoring
the consumer), and the "MAI Systems trilogy" approach, under which a
consumer does not have any ownership rights in the work if the copyright
holder characterizes the consumer as merely a licensee-an approach
favoring the copyright holder. In Vernor, the Ninth Circuit overturned
the district court's decision, which found for the consumer based on
Wise, and instead synthesized the Wise and MAI Systems trilogy in
favor of the copyright holder. This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit's
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attempted resolution of their precedents in Vernor did not actually rec-
oncile two approaches and instead effectively abandons Wise in favor of
the MAI Systems trilogy. This Note further argues that decisions like
Vernor that separate software from traditional first-sale protection harm
the public consciousness by depriving consumers of a secondary-sale
market for copyrighted software titles, thereby prohibiting future genera-
tions from the benefit of software that eventually becomes obsolete.
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INTRODUCTION: POTENTIAL AND PIRACY
Johannes Gutenberg pounds hundreds of letters into tiny lead cubes
in 1439.1 In 1877, Thomas Edison warbles "Mary Had a Little Lamb" as
a needle etches his voice onto a wax cylinder.2 The same year,
Eadweard Muybridge photographs the motion of a galloping horse to
settle a bet.3 Though the technological, societal and cultural significance
of the printing press, phonograph and motion picture is indisputable:
each breakthrough brings with it a new slate of legal dilemmas for which
our system is woefully unprepared. From cassette tapes to cloud com-
puting, each new medium is accompanied by untold promises and, inevi-
tably, unchecked piracy. As hobbyists and hackers "crack" the latest
copyright protections as quickly as media companies implement them,
the law struggles to evolve alongside technology.
As the means of storing and distributing information have evolved
from tangible to digital media, piracy has also become firmly entrenched
in the digital domain, no longer inhibited by the confines of a corporeal
world, and its effects are wide reaching. Until recently, the inherent lim-
itations of tangible media kept piracy somewhat in check; for example,
wide-scale distribution of pirated VHS tapes or floppy disks is expen-
1 "Johannes Gutenberg," ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONuNE (2010), http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/249878/Johannes-Gutenberg (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
2 "Thomas Alva Edison," ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONuINE (2010), http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/l79233/Thomas-Alva-Edison (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
3 "Eadweard Muybridge," ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (2010), http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/399928/Eadweard-Muybridge (last visited Aug. 9, 2011).
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sive, risky and logistically difficult.4 In the twenty-first century, infor-
mation itself has become paramount-with movies, music and games-
encoded as ones and zeros-seamlessly streamed to billions worldwide.
For instance, compact disc sales have been steadily dropping as online
music continues to proliferate in the industry and by 2011, some analysts
predict that digital MP3 sales will surpass the traditional brick-and-mor-
tar market.5 Netflix, Hulu and other streaming media outlets continue to
grow in popularity as DVD and Blu-ray sales decline. 6 As content pro-
ducers and copyright holders fight to keep control of their now intangible
commodities, courts struggle to apply the law to a technological market
that they often do not fully grasp.
One of the long-standing principles of American copyright law is
the "first-sale" doctrine. As codified in the Copyright Act of 1976, first-
sale entitles the bona fide purchaser of a copyrighted work to sell or
otherwise dispose of that copy without the permission of the copyright
holder.7 No one would contest that when one purchases an apple, one is
free to do with it what she wishes: she may eat it or store it for later. She
might even decide she no longer likes the apple and give it to a friend
or-for the more entrepreneurially minded-sell it. The same principles
apply to copyrighted material. While originally applied to books,8 courts
have extended first-sale to new media formats,9 making consumer alter-
natives like libraries, video rentals and eBay possible. The uniformity
with which courts apply the first-sale doctrine to books and videotapes is
currently absent from the jurisprudence surrounding computer software
and the associated rights of its purchasers.' 0
Current copyright law is unclear regarding the application of the
first-sale doctrine to software, and courts across the country have split in
determining the best solution." The issue is whether a lawful purchaser
4 See Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent Educational Fair Use, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 1,
20-21 (2002).
5 Casey Johnston, US Digital Music Sales to Eclipse CDs by 2010, ARS TECHNICA, Aug.
14, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2009/08/global-digital-music-sales-to-overtake-
physical-by-2016.ars.
6 Nate Anderson, Half of All Young Internet Users Now Watch TV Online, ARS
TECHNICA, Aug. 6, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2009/08/half-of-all-young-in-
ternet-users-now-watch-tv-online.ars.; Alex Dobuzinskis, ANALYSIS-Hollywood Warming to
Internet as DVDs Begin to Fade, REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2009/10/0 1/us-hollwood-dvd-analysis-sb-idUSTRE5900EW2009 1001.
7 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006).
8 See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) (establishing the first-sale
doctrine for books).
9 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(extending first-sale protection to Betamax video tapes).
10 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A)(201) (2006).
11 Compare MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that the copyright holder's characterization of software purchase as a license does not
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of the software may sell or give away her copy. Computer software, by
its very nature, cannot be sold and transferred in the traditional sense. 12
In order to initiate use of a program, an individual must copy it onto a
computer's hard drive or its temporary random access memory (RAM).' 3
Software manufacturers protect their goods through a wide array of digi-
tal rights management (DRM) techniques-using unique serial numbers
or other methods to keep the copy of the software linked to a specific
computer.14 Software manufacturers assert that they never actually sell
their software: they claim they merely license it temporarily.' 5 As a re-
sult, a purchaser is not permitted to sell or give away her copy.16
Users and consumer protection groups, however, maintain that they
are actually purchasing the software and should be allowed to use and
share it freely.17 They argue that the licensing language is hidden within
dense layers of legalese contained in end user licensing agreement
(EULA), assent to which is mandatory before a consumer can install the
software.' 8 According to consumer rights advocates, these license agree-
ments, known as "click-through" or "shrinkwrap" agreements, destroy
the concept of ownership and strip end users of significant possessory
convey ownership to the customer), and Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elec., Inc.,
846 F. Supp. 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that entering a license agreement is not a sale for
purposes of the first sale doctrine), and Davidson & Assoc., Inc. v. Internet Gateway, Inc., 334
F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1175 (E.D. Mo. 2004), affd sub nom. Davidson & Assoc. v. Jung, 422 F.3d
630 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendants who purchased computer bought a license to use
the software but did not buy the software), with In re DAK Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.
1995) (holding that the economic realities of a particular arrangement determines ownership of
software), and Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Ctr., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1221 (D. Utah
1997) vacated in part, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that "shrinkwrap" license
included with software is invalid as software transactions do not merely constitute the sale of a
license to use the software), and SoftMan Prod. Co., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d
1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that a transaction involving a single payment giving the buyer
an unlimited period in which it has a right to possession is a sale).
12 See generally Christian H. Nadan, Software Licensing in the 21st Century: Are
Sofhare "Licenses" Really Sales, and How Will the Software Industry Respond?, 995 PLI
PAT 815 (2010); LARRY LESsIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DowN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004) available at http://
www.free-culture.cc/freeculture.pdf.
13 Nadan, supra note 12, at 821-22.
14 INDICARE PROJECT, THE CONSUMER'S GUIDE To DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 2
(2006), http://www.indicare.org/tiki-download-file.php?fileld=195.
15 See Vemor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1104-06 (9th Cir. 2010).
16 Brief for Software & Information Industry Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellant and Reversal at 4, Vemor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-
35969), 2010 WL 894742, at *4 ("[Tihe 'mass market' consumer software industry has been
built almost exclusively upon licensing, its economic foundations depend upon licensing, and
'overriding' such licenses would have far-reaching, adverse effects.").
17 Fred von Lohmann, You Bought It, You Own It: Vernor v. Autodesk, EIECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUNDATION DEEPLINKS BLOG (Feb. 11, 2010, 9:29 PM), http://www.eff.org/deep-
links/2010/02/you-bought-software-you-own-it-vernor-v-autodesk.
18 Annalee Newitz, Dangerous Terms: A User's Guide to EULAs, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION WHITEPAPERS (2005), http://www.eff.org/wp/dangerous-terms-users-guide-eulas.
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rights without their consent or knowledge.19 As digital merchandise is
freely and effortlessly reproduced and replicated, the line between legiti-
mate transfer and illegal reproduction is not clearly defined, though
courts have made many attempts to do So. 2 0
Part I of this Note will explore the evolution of the first-sale doc-
trine in the context of various court cases regarding evolving technolo-
gies and will discuss the confused state of the doctrine with respect to
computer software. Part II of this Note will analyze the decision in Ver-
nor v. Autodesk, Inc.2 1 and attempt to reconcile the Ninth Circuit's ruling
with its own precedents, the doctrines of the other circuits and the Su-
preme Court's jurisprudence. Part m of this Note will argue that the
Ninth Circuit decided Vernor incorrectly and will explore the negative
economic consequences of Vernor and other recent Ninth Circuit deci-
sions, like UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 22 on consumers and the
resale industry alike. Part IV of this Note will explore the negative ef-
fects that denying first-sale protection to purchasers of computer
software could have on the open exchange of ideas and information, and
will suggest that either Congress or the courts must reconfigure software
copyright law to offer the same protections and balance of consumer-
copyright power afforded its brethren in more traditional media. Surely
the law would not stand for a copyright system that could decimate li-
braries across the nation by including the words, "[t]his text is not for
library use, and may not be given away or resold," printed in tiny letters
on the back pages of a book. This Note concludes by suggesting that
computer software should be treated no differently.
I. FROM BOOKS To BLU-RAY: THE EVOLUTION OF
FmsT-SALE DOCTRMIE
The United States Supreme Court established the first-sale doctrine
in 1908 in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.23 In Bobbs-Merrill, a publisher
included a notice in an edition of the novel The Castaway that read:
"[t]he price of this book at retail is $1 net. No dealer is licensed to sell it
at a less price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement
of the copyright." 24 The defendants purchased a wholesale lot of the
book and sold it in their stores for eighty-nine cents. 25 Writing for the
Court, Justice Day established the first-sale doctrine in response to a
question considered a "new one in this court, and one that involves the
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
22 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
23 See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
24 Id. at 341.
25 Id.
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extent of the protection which is given by ... copyright." 26 Justice Day
wrote:
In our view the copyright statutes, while protecting the
owner of the copyright in his right to multiply and sell
his production, do not create the right to impose, by no-
tice, such as is disclosed in this case, a limitation at
which the book shall be sold at retail by future purchas-
ers, with whom there is no privity of contract. 27
The Court thus established a limitation on copyright holders and a
new right for American consumers. 28 Congress codified the first-sale
doctrine the following year in 1909,29 and it remained undisturbed over
the next few decades.30
The next step in the first-sale doctrine's evolution coincided with
the birth of the videotape. As Betamax recorders and VCRs began ap-
pearing in American homes, media conglomerates attempted to block
their sale.31 Media companies argued that these new recording and play-
ing devices would facilitate widespread copying and unlawful distribu-
tion of copyrighted films and television shows.32 The Supreme Court
disagreed, ruling that copyright holders could not block the sale of VCRs
due to their significant potential for non-copyright-infringing usage.33
While the first-sale doctrine was not an explicit issue in the case, the
decision heralded the birth of the home media market; it would not be
long before video rental chains appeared across the country, paving the
way for the widespread distribution of media we know today. 34 Copy-
right holders continued to try to battle against the application of first-sale
26 Id. at 346.
27 Id. at 350.
28 The first-sale doctrine does not exist in the European Union, which instead follows the
principle of droit de suite. Essentially, droit de suite allows artists or their heirs to receive a fee
upon the resale of their works. "In the field of copyright, the resale right is an unassignable and
inalienable right, enjoyed by the author of an original work of graphic or plastic art, to an
economic interest in successive sales of the work concerned." Council Directive on the Resale
Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art, 2001/84, 2001 O.J. (L 272)
32-36, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?ri=CELEX:32001L
0084:EN:NOT.
29 See Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (amended 1976).
30 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 109 (2006) ("[T]he owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under
this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.").
31 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 659 F.2d 93 (9th Cir.
1981), rev'd 464 U.S. 424 (1984).
32 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 424 n.3, 424-25
(1984).
33 See id. at 442-56.
34 Jeffrey P. Cunard, Past as Precedent: Some Thoughts on Novel Approaches to the
Nexus of Digital Technologies and the Arts, 29 LEONARDO 192, 245-47 (2006).
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doctrine to videotapes, but their efforts proved fruitless.35 The advent of
DVD technology brought more legal challenges to the doctrine, yet
courts expanded the first-sale doctrine to cover this new medium as
well. 36
By the time the first computer programs emerged in the 1970s, the
new frontier of digital information as a copyrightable asset added more
fuel to the fires of first-sale confusion. Congress amended § 117 of the
Copyright Act in 1980, following a report from the National Commission
on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) proposing
Copyright Act amendments.3 7 As amended, Section 117 now permits the
"owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the mak-
ing of another copy or adaptation of that computer program" and that
such copies "may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred . . . only as
part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. "38 In
other words, the statute would seem to codify the application of the first-
sale doctrine to computer software. However, while the statute clearly
defines the first-sale privileges enjoyed by the owner of a computer pro-
gram,3 9 the statute does not clearly define "owner." As a result, software
manufacturers began to include language in their mandatory licensing
agreements denying the transfer of ownership to a purchaser; instead, the
software is merely "licensed" and thus exempt from the protections of
Section 117.40 Following the Section 117 amendments, then, the ques-
tion of what constitutes "ownership" under the statute fell on the courts
to decide.
Historically, in attempting to answer this question, courts have used
a number of different approaches. Initially, courts relied on how the cop-
yright holder characterized a transaction to determine whether a cus-
tomer purchased or licensed a program; in other words, courts would rely
on whether the seller used the term "license" or "sale" in the purchase
agreement. 4 1 In DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications,
35 Congress voted against a bill which would require rental stores to receive permission
from copyright holders in order to rent videotapes. See PAUL S. WALLACE, JR., CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., 1B82075, ISSUE BRIEF: COPYRIGHT LAW: LEGALIZING HOME TAPING OF AUDIO
AND VIDEO RECORDINGS 3 (1984).
36 See NEGB, LLC v. Weinstein Co. Holdings, 490 F. Supp. 2d 89 (D. Mass. 2007)
(ruling that a film studio had no right to restrict buyers of DVDs from renting them to third
parties).
37 Government Patent Policy Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1976)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006)).
38 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2006).
39 Id.
40 See, e.g., Nadan, supra note 12.
41 See Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computers & Elec., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 208
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (cementing the "characterization" approach with the caveat that the con-
sumer/defendant can potentially "prove" that the transaction was a sale); MAI Sys. Corp. v.
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Inc.,42 the Federal Circuit rejected this approach and opted instead to
analyze whether the restrictive language of a license agreement is "in-
consistent with the status of an owner." 43 Though slightly more balanced
than the "characterization" approach, this method still favored copyright
holders. Finally, in 2001, in SoftMan Products Co., LLC v. Adobe Sys-
tems, Inc.," the District Court for the Central District of California ex-
plicitly ruled for the first time that a computer program could be sold,
rather than licensed. 45 The court reasoned:
[T]he circumstances surrounding the transaction strongly
suggests that the transaction is in fact a sale rather than a
license. For example, the purchaser commonly obtains a
single copy of the software, with documentation, for a
single price, which the purchaser pays at the time of the
transaction, and which constitutes the entire payment for
the "license." The license runs for an indefinite term
without provisions for renewal. In light of these indicia,
many courts and commentators conclude that a "shrink-
wrap license" transaction is a sale of goods rather than a
license. 46
In addition, the court noted that "Adobe's position in this action would
be more akin to a journalist who claimed that ownership of the copyright
to an article allowed him or her to control the resale of a particular copy
of a newspaper that contained that article." 47
As a result, two approaches to the ownership question have solidi-
fied. On the one hand, the traditional approach allows software compa-
nies to characterize the terms of the transaction as either a license or a
sale through licensing agreements; this approach favors copyright hold-
ers. The SoftMan Products approach, on the other hand, grants owner-
ship regardless of the language buried within a EULA; this approach
favors consumers. Courts across the country remain divided on this issue
and their attempts to reconcile the two approaches have led to even more
confusion.
Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (establishing the "characterization" ap-
proach). See also Nadan, supra note 12
42 DSC Cornmc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
43 Id. at 1362.
44 SoftMan Prod. Co., LLC v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
45 Id. at 1085.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1089.
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II. WISE, MAI SYSTEMS AND VERNOR: THE SPLIT WITHIN THE
NINTH CIRCUIT
In 2007, Timothy Vemor, an eBay "power seller" who made his
living through the popular auction site, attempted to sell copies of
Autodesk's popular AutoCAD drafting computer software.48 Autodesk
invoked the Digital Millennium Copyright Act in an attempt to stop Ver-
nor from selling the software, which he had purchased secondhand from
CTA-a Seattle architecture firm.49 Vemor countered by suing for a
declaratory judgment that his actions did not constitute copyright in-
fringement.50 In the District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton, Vernor argued that during the initial sale of the software to CTA,
Autodesk transferred ownership to the architecture firm.51 Subsequently,
CTA transferred ownership to Vemor through their resale of the
software. 52 Furthermore, Vemor argued that any subsequent sale of the
software will likewise transfer ownership.53
Autodesk countered that they never transferred the ownership of the
software to CTA.54 In fact, Autodesk asserted that they never transferred
ownership at all.55 Accordingly, CTA's license agreement with
Autodesk barred any transfer of the software without written permission
and declared that the "[tlitle and copyrights to the Software and accom-
panying materials and any copies made by you remain with Autodesk."56
To answer the question, the district court had to decide between two
conflicting Ninth Circuit precedents: United States v. Wise and the "MAI
[Systems] trilogy" of cases.57
Wise was a Ninth Circuit criminal copyright infringement case in-
volving the sale of used movies.5 8 The case involved a number of agree-
ments governing the transfer of film prints, many of which expressed
language quite similar to a modern EULA click-through agreement, in-
cluding a provision that prints "shall not be sold, leased, licensed or
loaned by you to any other person." 59 While the court did not establish a
bright-line rule, it ruled that "[w]hile the provision for pay-
ment . . . standing alone does not establish a sale, when taken with the
48 Vemor v. Autodesk, Inc., No. C07-1189RAJ, 2009 WL 3187613, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 30, 2009), vacated, 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at *3.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Vernor, 2009 WL 3187613 at *4.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at *5.
58 United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1977).
59 Id. at 1192.
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rest of the language of the agreement, it reveals a transaction strongly
resembling a sale with restrictions." 60 Judge Jones, writing for the dis-
trict court in Vernor, claimed that Wise establishes that
even a transfer that places severe restrictions on the use
and disposition of a copy of copyrighted material can
transfer ownership of that copy and that in each instance
in which the transferee could, at his election, retain pos-
session of the transferred copy indefinitely, and the cop-
yright holder had no right to regain possession, the court
found an ownership transfer.61
Thus, according to the district court, Wise stands for the proposition that,
much like the SoftMan Products approach, the question of ownership
depends on the circumstances of the transaction, not how the copyright
holder characterizes it.62
The MAI Systems trilogy of cases includes MAI Systems Corp. v.
Peak Computer, Inc.,63 Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express
Co.,64 and Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Dep't.6 5 MAI
Systems, though the namesake for the approach, only addresses the ques-
tion of ownership in a one-sentence footnote, stating that since "MAI
licensed its software, the [customers to whom it licensed the software] do
not qualify as 'owners' of the software and are not eligible for protection
under § 117."66 Notably, the opinion did not cite or mention Wise. 67
Triad Systems, like MAI Systems, did not involve purchasers of
software but rather unauthorized repair and maintenance of computers
running copyrighted programs; the panel considered three distinct forms
of a software transfer agreement, and found that only an agreement
where it was clear that the software was "sold . . . outright" transferred
ownership to the purchaser.68 The court found that the other agreements,
one of which required a "transfer fee" before the software could be sold
on computer systems, and another of which prohibited any transfer what-
soever, transferred no ownership rights to the consumer.69
Wall Data is the most recent addition to the MAI Systems trilogy
and the only case to directly address the issue of an actual software
60 Id.
61 Vernor, 2009 WL 3187613 at *5.
62 Id.
63 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993).
64 Triad Sys. Corp. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995).
65 Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006).
66 MAI Sys. Corp., 991 F.2d at 518 n.5.
67 Id. at 511.
68 Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1333.
69 Id.
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user's ownership.70 In the Wall Data opinion, the panel clarified the
ruling in MAI Systems:
Generally, if the copyright owner makes it clear that she
or he is granting only a license to the copy of software
and imposes significant restrictions on the purchaser's
ability to redistribute or transfer that copy, the purchaser
is considered a licensee, not an owner, of the software.7 1
The court went on to state that "if a software developer retains own-
ership of every copy of software, and merely licenses the use of those
copies, § 117 does not apply." 7 2
The district court in Vernor followed the Wise approach for the sim-
ple reason that it was the oldest of the conflicting precedents.7 3 Though
they were "loath ... to apply this rule unless there [was] no way to avoid
the conflict between the opinions," the court found that Wise and Wall
Data were irreconcilable, and that "a faithful application of Wall Data
leads to the conclusion that the Autodesk License is a mere license,
whereas Wise leads to the opposite conclusion."74 Though the opinion
touched upon the various policy concerns set out by both parties, the
court's decision relied solely on precedent rather than a policy
judgment.75
III. AN "UN- WisE" DECISION
On September 10, 2010, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district
court's ruling in Vernor by reinterpreting Wise and the MAI Systems tril-
ogy. 7 6 Writing for the three-judge panel, Judge Callahan interpreted
Wise as establishing a multi-factor balancing test that includes possession
among several other non-dispositive factors.7 7 The opinion combined el-
ements from both Wise and the MAI Systems trilogy, setting out three
conditions to determine the question of ownership:78 (1) whether the
copyright holder has specified if it is granting the user ownership or
70 Wall Data, Inc., 447 F.3d at 769.
71 Id. at 785.
72 Id.
73 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., No. C07-ll89RAJ, 2009 WL 3187613 *11 (W.D. Wash.
Sept. 30, 2009), vacated, 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Vemor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
77 Id. at 1108 (citing United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190-92) (9th Cir. 1977))
(noting that the Ninth Circuit in Wise "considered (a) whether the agreement was labeled a
license, (b) provided that the copyright owner retained title to the prints, (c) required the return
or destruction of the prints, (d) forbade duplication of prints, or (e) required the transferee to
maintain possession of the prints for the agreement's duration.").
78 Id. at 1110-11.
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merely a license;79 (2) whether the agreement significantly restricts the
consumer's ability to transfer the software;80 and (3) whether the agree-
ment imposes notable use restrictions."'
The Ninth Circuit, moreover, acknowledged the legislative history
of 17 U.S.C. §§ 109 and 117 in its opinion. 82 The House Report for
§ 109 re-emphasizes that the first-sale doctrine is intended only for the
benefit of those who acquire a copyrighted work through "outright sale,"
and that it does not apply to those who merely possess a copy.8 3 Further-
more, the original language of § 117 as proposed by the CONTU-limit-
ing exclusive rights for computer programs-made no reference to
"owners"; instead, it used the term "rightful possessor," which is a much
less strict standard than ownership. 84 According to the court, Congress's
substitution of the word "owner" for "rightful possessor . .. suggests that
more than rightful possession is required for § 117 to apply."8 5 Namely,
Congress did not intend licensees subject to significant transfer and use
restrictions to receive the benefit of the "essential step defense."86
The Ninth Circuit then addressed Vernor's four counterarguments in
defense of the district court's ruling.87 First, the court disagreed with
Vernor's argument that Wise established the "indefinite possession" test
as the key factor of ownership transfer.88 Instead, the court held that
Wise established a multi-factor ownership test, of which indefinite pos-
session is a persuasive but non-dispositive factor.89
79 Id. at 1110.
80 Id. at 1110-11.
81 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1111.
82 Id. at 1112.
83 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 79 (1976)).
84 Id. (citing DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 1999)).
85 Id.
86 Id. The "essential step" defense allows the owner of a copy of a computer program to
lawfully make a copy or adaptation of the program provided that the new copy is "created as
an essential step in the utilization of the ... program in conjunction with a machine" or is used
for temporary backup and archival purposes. 17 U.S.C. §I 117(a)(1) (2006). This allows the
owner of a piece of software to install the computer program on his machine, which often
requires copying the copyrighted code onto a hard drive or internal RAM. See Micro-Sparc,
Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984) (holding that manually typing code
sold in printed form into a computer in order to use the program does not constitute infringe-
ment); Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line Med. Instruments Co., 922 F. Supp. 299 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (holding that inadvertently causing a copy of a copyrighted data table to be loaded into a
computer system 's RAM through the routine operation of an ophthalmological laser system
does not constitute infringement). Cf MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that loading copyrighted software into RAM constitutes
reproduction).
87 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1113-14.
88 Id. at 1113.
89 Id.
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Second, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with Vernor's contention that
reversing the district court's ruling would create a split between the Fed-
eral and Second Circuits.90 The court first held that the Federal Circuit's
ruling in DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc.,91
in which the Federal Circuit rejected the MAI Systems characterization of
all licensees as non-owners, still regarded MAI Systems "instructive." 92
The court then distinguished Vernor from the Second Circuit's decision
in Krause v. Titleserv.93 In Krause a software developer sued his former
employer for making allegedly infringing modifications to a program but
due to the employment relationship between the parties, the court held
that the facts and analysis in such a situation are not contrary to their
determination of ownership in the Vernor case.94
Third, Vernor argued that he is entitled to a first-sale defense based
on Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus,95 the case that established the doctrine in
1908.96 The court rejected this argument, ruling that Bobbs-Merrill "did
not and could not address the question of whether the right to use
software is distinct from the ownership of copies of software," and that
the court was "explicit that its decision did not address the use of restric-
tions to create a license." 97
Finally, Vernor argued that the "economic realities" of the situation
demonstrated that Autodesk was in the business of selling, not licensing,
software.98 Because Autodesk allows customers to possess their copies
of the software indefinitely and does not require recurring license pay-
ments, he contended that the court should treat the transfer as a sale.99 In
support of this contention, Vernor cited In re DAK Industries,1oc a case
in which the Ninth Circuit "interpreted the Bankruptcy Code to decide
whether a particular transaction should be considered a pre-petition
sale."101 Nonetheless, the court in Vernor did not find that the ruling in a
bankruptcy case was applicable to software sales and dismissed the
argument. 102
90 Id.
91 DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
92 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1113.
93 Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2005).
94 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1113.
95 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). For a discussion of the first-sale
doctrine, see supra Part I.
96 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1114.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 In re DAK Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 1995).
101 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1114 ("When applying the bankruptcy code to this transaction, we
must look through its form to the 'economic realities of the particular arrangement.' ") (quoting
In re DAK Indus., Inc., 66 F.3d at 1095).
102 Id. ("Nothing in DAK is contrary to our reconciliation of Wise and the MAI trio.").
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Upon closer analysis, however, the Vernor court did not convinc-
ingly reconcile the conflicts between Wise and the MAI Systems trilogy
of cases. In Wise, the Ninth Circuit wrote that since "[clopyright propri-
etors frequently transfer rights in their works by complicated agreements
which cannot simply be called 'sales' [,] [i]n each case, the court must
analyze the arrangement at issue and decide whether it should be consid-
ered a first sale."103 Though the Vernor opinion disregarded DAK Indus-
tries as a bankruptcy case irrelevant to software copyright, the DAK
Industries court adopted a Wise approach in analyzing whether Microsoft
had sold a lump sum of software units to DAK or simply granted them
permission to use a defined piece of intellectual property.104 After ana-
lyzing the arrangement and facts of the transfer, the court concluded that
"the economic realities of this agreement indicate[d] that it was basically
a sale, not a license to use." 10 5 In a footnote, the court further elaborated,
"Because we look to the economic realities of the agreement, the fact
that the agreement labels itself a 'license' and calls the payments 'royal-
ties,' both terms that arguably imply periodic payment for the use rather
than sale of technology, does not control our analysis."106
DAK Industries indicates that the Ninth Circuit was willing, in at
least one instance, to use the Wise "economic realities" approach to de-
termine software ownership. Moreover, several district courts within the
Ninth Circuit cite DAK Industries when deciding whether to apply the
Wise approach to ownership. 07 Contrary to Vernor, these cases indicate
that DAK Industries has been used frequently and successfully through-
out the Ninth Circuit to apply the Wise analysis to the realm of digital
copyright.
Even though the Ninth Circuit decided both cases, the Wise analysis
is irreconcilable with the MAI Systems methodology. In a footnote citing
no authority, the MAI Systems court created an entirely different ap-
proach to determining ownership: "Since MAI licensed its software, the
Peak customers do not qualify as 'owners' of the software and are not
eligible for protection under § 117."108 This new approach, relying ex-
clusively on the label applied to the transaction, has been criticized by
103 United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting United States
v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 731 (E.D. Pa. 1975)) (emphasis added).
104 In re DAK Indus., 66 F.3d at 1095-96.
105 Id. at 1096.
106 Id. at 1095 n.2.
107 See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1060 (C.D. Cal.
2008) ("In determining whether a transaction is a sale or a license, courts must analyze the
'economic realities' of the transaction." (quoting In re DAK Indus., 66 F.3d at 1095)); SoftMan
Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2001) ("It is well-settled
that in determining whether a transaction is a sale, a lease, or a license, courts look to the
economic realities of the exchange." (citing In re DAK Indus., 66 F.3d 1091)).
108 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993).
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commentators and other appellate courts. 109 The Federal Circuit noted,
in DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., that the
MAI Systems approach "fail[s] to recognize the distinction between own-
ership of a copyright, which can be licensed, and ownership of copies of
the copyrighted software."o10 The Vernor opinion dismissed this criti-
cism by noting that the DSC Communications court still considered MAI
Systems "instructive.""' The Federal Circuit, however, had plainly re-
jected using the MAI Systems approach in its jurisdiction, noting that "a
party who purchases copies of software from the copyright owner can
hold a license under a copyright while still being an 'owner' of a copy of
the copyrighted software for purposes of [S]ection 117."' 12
The Vernor court attempted to reconcile the differing precedents of
MAI Systems and Wise by creating a framework that incorporates lan-
guage from both sets of cases. Nontheless, the court did not explain how
it arrived at this conclusion, simply stating that it "read Wise and the MAI
Systems trilogy to prescribe three considerations that we may use to de-
termine whether a software user is a licensee, rather than an owner of a
copy."H 3 It is difficult to understand how this reconciliation occurred, as
the two approaches contradict each other. If, under the MAI Systems
approach, the copyright owner can characterize the transfer as a license
and retain title, there is no need to analyze the Wise economic factors
between the two parties. Conversely, under the Wise "economic reali-
ties" approach, the mere characterization of a transfer as a license cannot
be the controlling factor.
Vernor's attempt to reconcile the two precedents, however, seems to
follow MAI Systems entirely and ignore Wise. The elucidated factors
characterize the transaction based entirely on the copyright holder's
standpoint, disregarding the Wise economic analysis in favor of the char-
acterization of the transfer approach.114 The Vernor test primarily relies
on the vocabulary of the transfer agreement itself, as characterized by
and within the control of the copyright holder, thus tipping the balance of
power away from the consumer. Ostensibly, this test follows the MAI
Systems approach and contradicts the Wise approach.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit erred by not resolving the dispute in
an en banc decision, as prescribed by their own holding in Atonio v.
109 See, e.g., DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 8.08[B][l][c], at 8-136 (2009); DSC Commc'ns Corp., v. Pulse Comrnmc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d
1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Wall Data, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty Sheriffs Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 785
n.9 (9th Cir. 2006) ("We recognize that our decision in MAI has been criticized.").
110 DSC Commc'ns, 170 F.3d at 1360.
111 Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1113 (9th Cir. 2010).
112 DSC Commc'ns, 170 F.3d at 1360.
13 Vernor, 621 F.3d at 1110.
114 Id. at 1111.
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Wards Cove Packing Co.,115 which held that "the appropriate mechanism
for resolving an irreconcilable conflict is an en banc decision" when
"consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain the
uniformity of its decisions."116 Though the court is obligated to recon-
cile prior precedents if possible, reconciliation must be done through
carefully distinguishing facts and applying those facts to separate scena-
rios."' Here, where the conflict consists of conflicting, entirely separate
analytical frameworks, the court should have undertaken an en banc re-
view to settle the dispute.118
IV. ABANDONED WARES: FIRST-SALE'S EFFECT ON THE MARKET AND
PUBLIC CONSCIOUSNESS
Vernor, if it stands, could potentially undermine the policy reasons
that informed the Bobbs-Merrill decision to create the first-sale doctrine.
Despite Vernor's dismissal of Bobbs-Merrill because of the unforeseen
nature of digital copyright, the heart of the issue is, in fact, quite similar
in both cases. In each, a copyright owner is attempting to use the stan-
dard copyright notice attached to a work to control its post-sale distribu-
tion. Although the panel attempted to distinguish Bobbs-Merrill by
noting that the Supreme Court said that there was no claim in that case
regarding licenses,11 9 closer analysis reveals that its distinction is merely
semantic. Vernor allows Autodesk to do precisely what the copyright
holder in Bobbs-Merrill could not do-prevent resale of the product-
simply by characterizing the post-sale restrictions as a "license."
The confusion here lies in the new definition of the term "license."
According to statute, the owner of a copyright has the exclusive right "to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." 20
Nowhere does copyright law confer a right to distribute tangible goods
by "license." Copyright law protects owners' reproduction rights-their
rights to make copies and protect themselves from counterfeits, plagia-
rism and piracy. They may license their right to copy to others, but this
license is completely different from the one used by software manufac-
turers in cases like MAI Systems and Vernor. When a court analyzes
these software "licenses," it does so under the erroneous assumption that
they are fundamentally similar to the traditional notion of licensing copy-
rights, rather than the new definition offered by software companies.
115 Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 810 F.2d 1477, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1987) (en
banc).
116 Id. at 1478-79.
117 See, e.g., Cisneros-Perez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006).
118 See Atonio, 810 F.2d at 1478-79.
119 Vemor, 621 F.3d at 1114.
120 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006).
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Click-through agreements, shrinkwrap agreements and EULAs are not
licenses in the traditional sense but rather function by "permanently
transferring a good while purporting to retain title to [it]."121
Why is it so important to protect the definition of ownership? How
does the public benefit from retaining the ability to own and transfer
software? The most tangible benefit to the consumer is a competitive
retail market: "[o]nce a copyright owner sells copies of a work at a
wholesale price to a retailer, the retailer is free as a matter of copyright
law to resell those copies to the public at whatever price she chooses."l 2 2
Denying copyright holders the power to prescribe the price for which
their work sells encourages a free, efficient and competitive marketplace.
Moreover, the first-sale doctrine provides for a secondary-sale mar-
ket, allowing consumers to sell their own used goods and purchase
others, often at significantly lower prices. In an amicus brief in support
of Vernor, eBay noted that these secondary markets "promote entrepre-
neurship and innovation, facilitating the development of resale busi-
nesses that contribute to the American economy while respecting the
balance of rights Congress struck in the Copyright Act."1 2 3 In 2010
alone, eBay reported $1.8 billion of income.12 4 For video game retailer
GameStop, "used game sales ... account[ed] for 49.1%-or $204 [mil-
lion]-of its total profit in the first quarter of 2008."125 The secondary
market allows consumers who cannot afford to purchase a new product
to buy it used, at a lower price, thereby allowing them access to works
and information from which they would otherwise be barred.12 6 Further,
the secondary market may actually encourage consumers to purchase un-
used products:
Because a consumer can resell her copy once she has
used it and no longer wishes to retain it, the total price
she will have paid will be the price charged for the copy
121 Brief for Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-
Appellant at 12, Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-35969), 2010
WL 4199708, at *12.
122 R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L.
REv. 577, 585 (2003).
123 Brief for eBay, Inc., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellee and Affirmance at 9-10,
Vemor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-35969), 2010 WL 894741, at
*9-.10.
124 Joseph Galante, EBay Rises After Profit Beats Estimates on Spending, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 21, 2010, 10:11 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/newspid=newsarchive&sid=an-
csfne9q7U.
125 Aaron Linde, Used Game Make Up 49% of GameStop Q1 Profit, SHACKNEWS (May
22, 2008, 1:45 PM), http://www.shacknews.com/onearticle.x/52815.
126 Reese, supra note 122, at 587.
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less the amount she receives for the resale of the copy
that the first sale doctrine enables. 127
Under Vernor, though, software companies may deny these secon-
dary markets access to their products by simply including the magic
words of a licensing agreement. While the tangible economic effects
from such an arrangement are quite compelling, there are other, more
ominous implications of the Vernor decision. As a brief filed by the
American Library Association and others in support of Vernor states,
"While the grant of exclusive rights serves as an engine driving the crea-
tion of expressive works, it is the first sale doctrine that has guaranteed
the preservation and continued availability of those works." 128 Law-
rence Lessig, in his book Free Culture, writes that a book typically has
two lives: after a book has worn out its welcome as a commercial object,
it continues to live on in libraries and the secondary market. 129 Lessig
notes that an average book goes out of print within twelve months of its
initial release; film and sound recordings have a similarly short shelf-
life.130 Despite these arguments against Vernor, the Federal Circuit
plainly rejected using the MAI Systems approach in their jurisdiction,
noting that "a party who purchases copies of software from the copyright
owner can hold a license under a copyright while still being an 'owner'
of a copy of the copyrighted software for purposes of section 117."131
Thousands of works have been preserved for the public benefit
through the first-sale doctrine, but under Vernor there would be no such
protection for software. Due to the rapid progress of technology,
software often becomes orphaned after a few months or years, after
which time the out-of-print programs become known as
"abandonware." 132 Without the ability to resell software, hundreds of
copyrighted works and expressions, even those as mundane as out-of-
date architectural drafting software such as AutoCAD, are in danger of
becoming extinct.
127 Id.
128 Brief for American Library Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff at
8, Vemor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-35969), 2010 WL 894740
at *8 (emphasis added).
129 LESSIG, supra note 12 at 225.
130 See id. at 113. See also Reese, supra note 122 at 593 (citing estimates that 60% of
sound recordings are out of print); Anthony Kaufman, The Vanishing: The Demise of VHS,
and the Movies Disappearing Along with It, MUSEUM OF THE MOVING IMAGE, Feb. 26, 2009,
http:/ www.movingimagesource.us/articles/the-vanishing-20090226 ("[O]f the 157,068 titles
listed [with Turner Classic Movies] as of late February 2009, fewer than 4 percent are availa-
ble on home video.").
131 DSC Commc'ns Corp. v. Pulse Commc'ns, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
132 Pamela Brannon, Reforming Copyright to Foster Innovation: Providing Access to Or-
phaned Works, 14 J. IwrELL. PRoF. L. 145, 154-55 (2006).
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Without a secondary market to keep these programs alive, the pub-
lic is denied the benefit of their existence. Imagine a library devoid of all
books which are no longer in print, or a university without access to a
resource of out-of-print and hard-to-find materials. Imagine a society in
which the spread of information, entertainment and knowledge is placed
entirely in the hands of copyright holders. The public has the right,
through first-sale and the secondary market, to keep books, films and
music alive well past the point at which their copyright holders deem
them desirable. Secondary sales protect privacy and prevent censorship,
allowing researchers the ability to access works without revealing their
reading and viewing choices to copyright owners.133 The existence of a
secondary market also makes it more difficult for a copyright owner to
censor or suppress works after their commercial release.134 Under MAI
and Vernor, this right is not extended to software. Simply by including
restrictive language in a faux-licensing agreement, software developers
deny the public consciousness of the benefit of hundreds if not thousands
of computer programs.
As computer software is currently still in its relative infancy, it is
still unclear what happens when the copyright of a program expires.
However, from a historical and archival standpoint, software can be just
as worthy of preservation as a printed work of Dickens or Melville. 135
For instance, there are hundreds of blogs and websites devoted to archiv-
ing the computer programs of yesteryear, 136 and any eBay search will
produce hundreds of dusty old floppy disks protecting history, eight
kilobytes at a time. Under Vernor, not only would the resale of these
133 See Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy
Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1245, 1330-31 (2001) ("[The secondary market pre-
vents efforts to] "control or monitor by whom the work is read, how many times it is read, in
what context it is read or used, or to whom it is subsequently transferred.").
134 Brief for American Library Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-
Appellant at *10, Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-35969),
2010 WL 894740 (citing Reese, supra note 122, at 595-602 (providing multiple examples of
copyright owners attempting to withdraw or suppress works after initial publication)).
135 See Kendra Mayfield, How to Preserve Digital Art, WIRED (July 23, 2002, 12:58 PM),
http://www.wired.com/culturellifestyle/news/2002/07/53712 ("It is clear that digital art will be
of long-term historical significance"). The article quotes Richard Rinehart, the director of digi-
tal media for the Berkeley Art Museum and Pacific Film Archive, who observes that "Nobody
knows the final, definitive answer for how to preserve this digital cultural heritage . .. over the
next few centuries[.]" Id.
136 For example, in 2003, the trustees of the Computer History Museum in Mountain
View, California formed the Software Preservation Group in order to "explore how to collect
and preserve software in support of the museum's mission," as well as "fostering an open
alliance of the many broadly-based collection efforts taking place today." COMPUTER HISTORY
MUSEUM: SoMrWARE PRESERVATION GROUP, http://www.computerhistory.org/groups/spg/ (last
visited Aug. 17, 2011). See, e.g., THE SoTwARE PRESERVATION SOCIETY, http://
www.softpres.org/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2011); Internet Archive Gets DMCA Exemption to
Help Archive Vintage Software, INTERNEr ARCmHVE, http://www.archive.org/about/dmca.php
(last visited Aug. 17, 2011).
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products be copyright infringement, but they would never have the
chance to be anything else. If software companies may declare that an
individual consumer does not own the program they purchased, how can
the work eventually belong to the public domain? Computer software
has an enormous impact on our daily lives, and the law should recognize
and protect its cultural significance.
CONCLUSION
Since Vernor, the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to decide an-
other first-sale case, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto.13 7 This, how-
ever, only added to the confusion. The court ruled that, "despite the
restrictive labeling," UMG did not create a license in recipients of pro-
motional CDs but instead conveyed title to their recipients.' 38 Once
again, the court seems to take a turn towards the Wise standard, making
their Vernor decision even more baffling. Though the court directly cites
Vernor, the opinion cites it in support of the proposition that "the mere
labeling of an arrangement as a license rather than a sale, although it was
a factor to be considered, was not by itself dispositive of the issue." 39
This language is directly contradictory with the "three components" anal-
ysis set out in Vernor: instead analyzing the transfer through a Wise-like
"economic realities" factor, the court seems to have already retreated
from its Vernor "reconciliation," further illustrating the need for an en
banc review to settle the issue once and for all.140
In light of the intentions of both Congress and the Supreme Court,
the economic benefits of a vibrant secondary market, and the continuing
enrichment of the public, it is incumbent on the Court to re-balance the
interests of first-sale doctrine to give copyright holders, consumers and
the public consciousness the protections, rights, and freedoms that they
deserve. Without the first-sale doctrine, libraries and universities would
not be possible. These institutions exist based on the implicit assumption
that knowledge should be preserved whenever possible, not subject to the
whims of a copyright holder. Less lofty but equally important, first-sale
allows for the existence of a secondary market, giving consumers the
right to keep alive works that they deem important. As traditional media
falls to the oncoming, online behemoth, it is imperative that we offer the
same legal protections to software and other digital information as those
afforded analog works.
137 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011).
138 Id. at 1177-78.
139 Id. at 1180.
140 Id.
